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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence for why individuals join unions instead of free-riding. I model 
membership as legal insurance. To test the model, I use the incidence of news stories concerning 
allegations against teachers in the UK as a plausibly exogenous shock to demand for such insurance. I 
find that, for every five stories occurring in a region, teachers are 2.2 percentage points more likely to 
be members in the subsequent year. These effects are larger when teachers share characteristics with 
the news story and can explain 45 percent of the growth in teacher union membership between 1992 
and 2010. 
 
 
 
 
Key words: unions, teachers, media, insurance 
JEL Codes:J51; J45; J32 
 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
I thank Sandy Black, Alex Bryson, Justin Gallagher, Claudia Hupkau, Steve Machin, Brendon 
McConnell, Emma Pickering, Imran Rasul, Felix Weinhardt, as well as the participants of the CEP 
Labour Workshop, CESifo Education Group, Lancaster University, UT Austin and UC Irvine. All 
remaining errors are my own. 
 Natalie Chen, University of Warwick. Wanyu Chung, University of Birmingham. Dennis 
Novy, University of Warwick and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.  
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 
 R. Murphy, submitted 2019. 
1 
1. Introduction
Currently, many US States are attempting to limit the power of unions through legislative
action, reducing their collective bargaining rights and ability to charge union dues. One example 
of these efforts is the implementation of ‘right-to-work’ legislation, which allows individuals to 
work in an industry without being required to join the union or pay dues.1 This brings up the 
longstanding question: why would employees choose to pay for membership, if they can benefit 
from better wages and working conditions generated through collective bargaining regardless 
(Olson, 1965; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Bryson and Forth, 2010)? Does the rise of such 
legislation signal the end of trade unions?  
Not necessarily. Arguments have been put forward for why individuals may continue join 
unions in situations where it is possible to free ride. These are reputation concerns (Akerlof, 1980; 
Booth, 1985; Naylor & Cripps, 1993), the appreciation of the benefits that unions provide (Jermeir 
et. al., 1986) and the existence of excludable benefits (Olson, 1965; Albanese and Van Fleet, 
1985).2 However, these theories have not been tested using modern empirical approaches beyond 
cross-sectional analysis. This paper tests that the existence of an excludable benefit can maintain, 
and even increase the demand for union membership in situations where individuals are able to 
free-ride.  
Teacher trade unions in the UK offer legal protection and advice to individuals who were 
members at the time when the allegation was made and when it was alleged to have occurred. If 
the perceived risk of having an allegation being made increases, then the demand for insurance 
against such risks would increase. In this paper I model union membership as a form of legal 
insurance, which is a private and excludable benefit for members. Therefore, as the subjective 
perceived risk of allegations increases, the latent demand for union membership among teachers 
will also increase. Moreover, individuals may react to new information about allegations differently 
depending on how relevant they perceive it to be to their situation. Ultimately, the provision of 
such services means that unions could continue to exist, even if employees are not required to pay 
union dues. 
1 Right-to work laws ban a particular type of employment contract that requires all employees – union or not – to 
pay fair share provisions, to cover the costs of negotiating and enforcing their contract. There are currently 27 
right-to-work states in the US. The four most recent are Kentucky (2017), West Virginia (2016) 
Wisconsin (2015),. In 2018 the Supreme Court issued a ruling that government employee unions cannot require 
represented workers to pay a cent in union dues or fees (Janus v. AFSCME). 
2 For a discussion of the categorisation of the reasons, see Chaison and Dhavale (1992). 
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I present a simple model where teachers have expectations regarding the likelihood of an 
allegation being made against them and the likelihood of being found innocent both with and 
without union representation. Each state of the world has an associated utility. Individuals choose 
between joining the union and paying their dues or not, but they receive the same wages regardless. 
From these assumptions I construct a series of comparative statics, showing, for an arbitrary teacher 
type, that the demand for union membership is increasing in the perceived risk of allegations. This 
model of rational decision-making forms the basis of a discrete choice estimation strategy, where 
individuals have expected utility from being a union member or not determined by their 
characteristics, idiosyncratic tastes and their perceived risk of allegations. This is directly translated 
into a logit model where the parameter of interest is the increased likelihood of union membership 
from an increase in perceived risk.     
To test the model, I use the UK teacher labour market. This labour market is comparable to a 
right-to-work state due to the 1990 Employment Act, which made it unlawful for any workplace to 
exclude from employment non-union members. Additionally, UK employees are not required to 
pay a union, even if that union is lobbying for higher wages and working conditions in their 
occupation, as is the case for teachers, who agree upon wages and conditions at the national level. 
Despite these facts, the UK has seen an increase in union density over the last thirty years against 
a background of de-unionisation in the economy as a whole (Neumann and Rissman, 1984; 
Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008).  
To examine whether this increase in union membership relates to the insurance role of unions, 
I require plausibly exogenous shocks to the perceived threat of an allegation being made. For this 
I use the number of newspaper stories concerning allegations against school teachers collected from 
Lexis Nexis over a twenty-year period. I exploit variation in the timing and location of these stories 
as exogenous shocks to the perceived threat to all teachers in that region. While I cannot observe 
how many or which newspapers an individual teacher reads, I assume changes in newspaper 
reporting reflect general changes in perceived threat, regardless of source (e.g., TV, internet, 
gossip). Therefore, the focus of the paper is not the impact of newspaper coverage per se, but how 
the perception of risk of allegations impacts union membership. 
I combine this measure for perceived threat with individual level characteristics and union 
membership data from the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) between 1992 and 2010. I find 
that unionisation rates increase with media coverage at the regional and national level. Conditional 
on individual characteristics plus year and region effects, five additional relevant news stories in a 
region increase the probability of union membership by 2.2 percentage points in the subsequent 
year. Additionally, the size of the effect is dependent on the relevance of the story to the individual 
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teacher. Teachers from secondary schools react to stories involving other secondary school 
teachers, but not significantly to stories involving primary school teachers. Similarly, the demand 
for union membership increases amongst male teachers when there is news coverage concerning 
other male teachers, but not female teachers. These heterogeneous effects suggest that it is 
something specific about the nature of the stories driving demand and not a spurious correlation. 
Estimating the latent demand for union membership, I find that 45 percent of the growth between 
1992 and 2010 can be explained by the increased threat proxied by media coverage. 
The finding that the provision of legal services has maintained and even increased the demand 
for teacher unions is in itself important given the impact unions have on student outcomes. Hoxby 
(1996), using the passage of duty-to-bargain laws, finds that unions are effective at diverting funds 
to teachers by increasing their salaries and reducing pupil-teacher ratios. Accordingly, Lovenheim 
and Willén (2016) find that attending school in a state that has a duty-to-bargain laws reduces 
earnings by $800 per year and decreases hours worked by 0.5 hours per week, culminating in a 
total annual cost to the US economy of $199 billion.3  
The main contribution of this paper is the establishment of a new source of demand for union 
representation, in the form of legal insurance. By doing so it illustrates that, despite the outlawing 
of ‘closed-shops’ in the UK, teacher unions persist and even flourish by offering and promoting a 
private and excludable service that is growing in demand. Previous papers have examined the 
excludable benefits of union membership in different forms of unemployment insurance. A set of 
international comparison papers have found union density to be higher in countries with the Ghent 
system, where unions provide finance to members during periods of unemployment, than in 
neighbouring countries (Holmlund & Lundborg, 1999; Clasen & Viebrock, 2008; Bryson et. al., 
2011). However, the concern with such comparisons is that they are potentially confounded by 
other cross-country differences. Blanchflower et. al. (1990) look within a country using cross 
sectional data to test another form of unemployment insurance, assuming that being a member 
reduces the risk of becoming unemployed. They find that the local unemployment rate has a 
positive impact on demand for union membership. This paper builds on the existing literature using 
repeated cross-sectional data and estimating the change in union density within UK regions over 
time as the perceived benefit from legal insurance changes.  
3
 Other papers have use regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the impact of union presence in private 
sector firms and find small impacts on business survival, employment, wages (DiNardo and Lee, 2004) and stock 
prices (Lee and Mas, 2012). 
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While the focus of the paper is explaining the continued demand for union membership, it also 
adds to the growing literature on the impact of news media on individuals’ expectations and 
decision making (see Della Vigna & La Ferrara (2015) for a review). 4 This paper contributes to 
the literature by showing that individuals react more according to how similar the story is to their 
own situation (by exploiting the characteristics of the teachers involved in each story, such as 
gender, school type and region). 
There are two non-mutually exclusive possible channels for this heterogeneity. First, teachers 
are rational and react more to incidents which share their characteristics because they are indicative 
of an increased threat of allegations made against teachers like them in the future. Second, teachers 
may simply react more strongly to stories where they share characteristics as such news stories are 
more salient to them. I provide indicative evidence in support of the first explanation. The 
likelihood of a newspaper story about a new allegation regarding a certain teacher type increases 
in the number of different reported cases of that type originating in that region in the previous year. 
That is, if there are more cases about male teachers in the press in one year, then there are generally 
more new cases against males in the press the next year. This is suggestive of teachers reacting to 
the news reports in a rational manner, on the assumption that increased news coverage relates to 
increased actual threat. However, this doesn’t rule out the possibility that teachers react to stories 
that involve teachers with similar characteristics to them due to higher salience. To understand 
whether the scale of the overall response reflects rational behaviour by teachers, I use data on actual 
allegations between 2007 and 2011 to calculate that the average teacher employed for 35 years has 
a 24 percent chance of having an unfounded allegation made against them.5 
The policy implication is that even in a right-to-work state, the demand for union membership 
can still remain, if unions provide a private service that is wanted and is not readily supplied by the 
private market.6 However, if a government were to provide the support to employees protecting 
them from allegations, this would crowd out some of the demand for union membership. Without 
such support, a rational action by teachers would be to join a union and be covered in the event of 
an allegation. 
4 Gentzkow & Della Vigna (2010) discuss media persuasive communication where the sender has potential interest 
in changing the behaviour of the consumer. For the purpose of this paper, I am assuming that the newspapers 
themselves have no interest in the actions of teachers (aside from buying newspapers). Therefore, unlike the 
literature on persuasion, my focus is not on determining persuasion rates, for which I would need exposure rates. 
5 These allegation data are only available from 2007 and for a limited number of regions and therefore could not 
be used for the main analysis. A horserace between actual and media-reported allegations is presented in the 
Appendix Table 8. I find that, while the two measures are correlated, only the media reports have a significant 
relationship with subsequent unionisation rate.  
6
 There is currently no private teacher insurance market available in the UK. The possible reasons for this are 
discussed in Section II.C.  
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 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details of 
teacher unions in the UK, along with anecdotal evidence of the increasing demand for unions as 
form of legal insurance. Section 3 formalises a model for union demand dependent on perceived 
threat of allegation and how it relates to the econometric specification. Section 4 describes the data 
sources and how the media coverage data was collected. Section 5 presents estimates of the impact 
of media coverage on demand for union membership, presents falsification exercises and explores 
the impact of actual versus reported allegations. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Institutional Detail
This section describes the institutional setting of teacher unions in the UK, with particular
attention paid to the validity of the assumptions required for the hypothesis: that it is possible to 
free-ride on traditional union benefits, that unions provide a source of legal insurance, and that the 
demand for this service is likely to be increasing. 
A: Union Membership in the UK 
As with most developed countries, the UK has experienced a large decline in union 
membership. Total membership in 1979 stood at 13.2 million. Twenty years later it had fallen to 
7.9 million (DfB, 2009). This was a combination of the de-industrialisation of the economy, 
technological advances automating many traditional union occupations, and policy changes 
(Bryson and Forth, 2010). During the 1980’s the UK government passed a series of Employment 
Acts diminishing the bargaining power of unions. Much of this legislation restricted the use of 
‘closed-shops,’ where employers were required to employ only union members.7 The culmination 
was the 1990 Employment Act, which made it unlawful for any workplace to exclude non-union 
members from employment, effectively making all workplaces ‘open-shops.’ A by-product of this 
legislation is that a single workplace may have multiple unions present, and it is possible for 
individuals to be members of more than one union should they choose to do so. It is typical for 
teacher unions to offer free membership while teachers are in initial teacher training and for 
teachers to join multiple unions only to quit them at the end of the training period.  
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 The 1982 Employment Act banned pre-entry closed shops, and closed shops were only permitted with 85 percent 
support. The 1988 Employment Act outlaws industrial action to establish or preserve closed shops and gave union 
members the right to ignore strikes. 
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This fall in union membership has occurred both across and within occupational groups. Over 
90 percent of occupational groups have seen a fall in union membership since 1979, but some 
occupations have experienced a rise in union membership. The five occupations with the highest 
percentage point increases in union density between 1992 and 2010 are educational assistants 
(28.7), secondary school teachers (12.5), primary school teachers (8.5), the police (6.7) and nurses 
(6.4).8 The fact that teachers were already one of the most unionised occupations makes these 
additional gains even more remarkable.9 In 1993, 76.5 percent of teachers were unionised, and by 
2005 this had reached a peak of 87.0 percent (10.5 percentage point gain). As Figure 1 shows, in 
the same period, the remainder of the UK workforce saw a 6 percentage point decline in union 
density. 
The occupational groups that experienced an increase share a common theme of employees 
having prolonged unsupervised interactions with vulnerable groups. This pattern is consistent with 
the notion that, as society has become increasingly litigious, occupations at most risk of accusations 
will respond most strongly. There will likely be many repercussions on labour markets, but one 
rational response by employees in such occupations would be to increase their demand for 
insurance against these risks. In this paper I document the reaction in the UK teacher labour market, 
as it is a well-defined occupational group with a large number of employees that has also received 
considerable press attention regarding allegations over the last two decades.10 
B: Teacher Unions in the UK 
Teacher unions have representatives in schools to defend the contractual working conditions of 
all teachers at the school level. Negotiations regarding teacher pay, pensions, and contractual 
conditions (e.g. hours worked, curriculum, pupil teacher ratios), however, are held at the national 
level. This means that it is impossible for unions to bargain only for their members, as non-union 
teachers employed in public sector schools will also receive any gains. Despite being able to gain 
8
 Author’s calculations are based on the QLFS of all three-digit occupational groups with at least 100 employees 
per year. The unionisation rate amongst the clergy also increased rapidly, reaching a peak in 2005 of 14.3 percent, 
up from a base of 2.8 percent in 1992, but had fewer than 100 observations for 5 of the 18 years. 
9 Educational assistants from 20.4% to 48.1%, secondary school Teachers from 76.1% to 88.6%, primary school 
Teachers from 82.3% to 90.8%, police from 76.8% to 83.5%, and nurses from 79.2% to 85.6%. 
10
 Some occupations are required to purchase indemnity insurance through joining a professional body. UK 
doctors are required to become members of the British Medical Association, which is the registered trade union 
for doctors. Physiotherapists and Radiologists each have a professional body which provides insurance coverage 
as well as professional and legal advice (Royal College of Radiologists, and Chartered Society of Physiotherapy). 
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from the union negotiations, non-members are not required to pay union dues.11 These factors 
make the UK teacher labour market a classic example of the trade union free-rider problem: why 
would teachers choose to pay the costs of union membership if their pay and working conditions 
are determined centrally? This is reflected summary statistics from the QLFS. Since 2001, only 75 
percent of teachers thought their pay and working conditions were affected by trade unions, but 
more than 87 percent of teachers were union members.12 There must be other benefits from being 
a union member. 
C: Unions as an Insurance Provider 
A rational explanation for some teachers being union members despite being able to free-ride on 
union negotiated pay and conditions (or even if they think unions provide no such benefits), is that 
teacher unions provide other benefits that are excludable to non-members. One such benefit, which 
is highly promoted by the unions, is the legal advice and protection provided in the event of an 
allegation being made.13 Teachers who are union members when the allegation is made and at the 
time of the alleged incident receive an official representative for the internal disciplinary meetings 
and legal representation in the event of an escalation.  
The teacher trade unions consider this service to be the major driver of union demand.14 As 
part of the terms and conditions of membership, many unions reserve the right to use the facts of 
successful cases to publicise their criminal representation scheme (NASUWT, 2014). Moreover, in 
a survey of 176 teachers that I conducted in 2010-11, I found that in answering the question “What 
were the MAIN reasons why you initially joined a teacher union?”, 85 percent of the respondents 
11
 Union dues are set by each union at a national level, in contrast to some other countries where the level of dues 
reflect the bargaining power at the local (school/district/state) level. There is a regional pay scale to account for 
the cost of living around London, but this differential is still negotiated at the national level. The annual 
membership fee for a full time teacher in 2015 for the two largest teacher unions in the UK were £167 NASUWT 
and £170 NUT, and have been constant in nominal terms since 2010. 
12
 One reason for not all teachers saying that their pay and conditions are affected by unions is that, since the 
dissolution of the Burnham Committee in 1986, teacher unions no longer had a seat on the teacher pay committee. 
This was replaced by the School Teachers Review Body (STRB), which is made up of academics and 
professionals who make pay recommendations to the government. Unions can submit evidence to the STRB but 
do not hold a seat.  
13
 Other excludable benefits offered by teacher unions include continuing professional development, group 
discounts, social status, and contributing to the union movement.  
14
 Paddy Marshal, Head Recruitment Officer NUT, in April 2009 stated in a phone interview in relation to the 
legal insurance that “the safety net is the biggest potential benefit.” Tracy Twist, Assistant General Secretary of 
NASUWT stated in a meeting with me that “a lot of teachers join because of these concerns.” 
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stated “support in the event of allegations from pupils” compared with 56 percent saying “to 
improve terms and conditions” (Appendix Table 1).  
There are currently no private insurance companies offering legal insurance to teachers in the 
UK.15 This begs the question, if there is a demand for private legal insurance, why doesn’t a market 
exist in which teachers can buy the service without the additional bundled costs involved with 
union membership? There are two likely reasons. First, were an insurer to enter into the market 
where the only benefit was risk insurance, it would risk adverse selection of consumers. The unions 
currently in the insurance market have a first mover advantage, in that they have a large non-
negatively selected pool of enrolees because they also offer benefits that are not related to insurance 
(e.g., information on teaching practice and conforming to social norms). Second, the regulations 
regarding internal school hearings prevent teachers from employing representation for themselves. 
The only forms of representation a teacher is allowed at these hearings are themselves or a union 
representative/attorney. Note that a corresponding situation exists in the US, where union members 
have ‘Weingarten Rights,’ meaning that they can request union representation at meetings that 
could lead to disciplinary action.16  In either country, teachers can still employ a lawyer if the 
incident proceeds beyond internal disciplinary matters. However, in both countries, union 
membership comes with access to legal counsel and liability coverage.17 
If the internal hearings deem the situation serious enough to warrant external authorities, either 
the police of the General Teaching Council (GTC) would be informed. In criminal cases this would 
be the police. Teachers found guilty of one of 42 offences, such as indecent assault on a child under 
16, are automatically put on List 99. This prevents the individual from ever working or volunteering 
to work with young people. For less serious cases teachers can be referred to the GTC, which would 
convene a panel consisting of two teachers, one lay member and a legal representative. Teachers 
found guilty of professional misconduct here can also be added to the list if the offence is deemed 
grievous enough. Examples include falsifying qualifications and assisting students with exams. In 
15
 Ascertained by requesting these services over the phone from the top five insurance companies (AIG, Aviva, 
RSA, AXA, Direct Line) in the UK, each year from 2011-16.  
16
 These rights have existed since a 1975 Supreme Court case National Labor Relations Board vs. Weingarten 
(Brennan & Supreme Court of The United States, 1975). Non-union employees have no equivalent rights. In 2000, 
non-union employees were allowed to have co-workers in such meetings but “do not have the right to legal 
counsel, union representatives, or other individuals who are not co-workers,” and even these rights were rescinded 
in 2004 (IBM, 2004). 
17 For example, the California Teachers' Association provides $1,000,000 coverage for legal defence costs in civil 
suits arising out of educational employment activities and up to $35,000 reimbursement of attorney fees and costs 
to defend employment-related criminal proceedings (CTA, 2019). 
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either case teachers can pay for their own legal representation, but these costs are not refundable 
even with a not guilty verdict. As a result, many teachers choose to be represented by trade unions. 
D: Nature of the Risk 
For the fear of allegations to explain the rise in demand for union membership, the threat of 
allegations also needs to have risen over this time period. There are no comparable records directly 
measuring the threat of allegations annually. However, the largest union in the UK (NASUWT) 
reported dealing with 71 cases of alleged sexual or physical abuse in 1991, 134 in 1992 and 158 in 
1993 (Independent, 1994) and then estimated dealing with 800-900 per year in 2009 (Keates, 
2009).18  
To obtain a more detailed and comprehensive measure of the threat against teachers, I use the 
number of national newspaper stories involving accusations of teachers. A detailed explanation of 
how this number is generated is provided in Section 4. There has been a large increase in the number 
of newspaper stories concerning allegations against teachers over time. Figure 3 shows that 
between 1992 and 1998 the average per year was 6.6, increasing to 37.9 in the period 1999 to 2005. 
Post 2005, there was a fall in the number of news stories in national newspapers. This coincides 
which a change in the law which gave more protection to teachers to prevent their case from being 
reported before a case had gone to term (HM Government, 2006).19  
Would a fear of allegations be rational for a teacher working in the UK today? To establish 
this basic tenet, I collected information on the actual allegations made against public sector 
employees who work with children and young people through use of the Freedom of Information 
Act. After contacting all 152 Local Authorities in England, I received responses from 118 (See 
Appendix 1 for detailed list). Unfortunately, it was compulsory only for Local Authorities to record 
this information from 2007 to 2011, and therefore the data span a relatively short period of time.  
The information received included which occupational sector the allegation was made against 
and the nature of the allegation.20 The education sector received more than half of all allegations, 
18
 NASUWT membership over this period increased by 63 percent (Certification Office, 2010) whilst the number 
of allegations against its members increased by 1,167 percent.   
19
 In accordance with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance, the police will not normally 
provide any information to media that might identify a teacher who is under investigation, unless and until the 
person is charged with a criminal offence. In exceptional cases where the police might depart from that rule (e.g., 
an appeal to trace a suspect), the reasons should be documented and partner agencies should be consulted 
beforehand. 
20
 There are 15 occupational groups: Social, Care, Health, Education, Foster Carers, Connexion, Police, YOT, 
Probation, CAFCASS, Secure Estate, NSPCC, Voluntary Youth Organisations, Faith Groups, Armed Forces, 
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with 52.6 percent despite representing only 42 percent of the workforce that work with children 
and young people (DCSF, 2008). Of these allegations, 56.9 percent are physical in nature and 23.9 
percent sexual, which is comparable to allegations for all non-educational occupational groups with 
52.5 percent and 25.1 percent, respectively (Table 1). These data also provide a count of the 
outcomes of allegations over the previous twelve months, which I have codified into four 
categories: (1) Not Upheld, (2) Police Involvement, (3) Disciplinary Procedures and (4) Referral.21 
These outcomes cannot be connected to occupations, but in general 46.1 percent of all allegations 
are not upheld (Table 2).  
To obtain a measure of actual threat, I calculate the number of allegations per teacher per year 
in the responding Local Authorities using total teacher employment taken from the School 
Workforce in England (2011). In 2007, this figure was 1.49 allegations per 100 teachers per year 
and had marginally increased to 1.5 by 2010. Combining this with the proportion of allegations 
that are not upheld, I derive an approximate objective measure of risk of a teacher having a non-
upheld allegation made against them. Assuming that these allegations are evenly concentrated over 
teachers and over time and that 46.1 percent of allegations are not upheld, an average teacher over 
a career of 35 years can expect a 24.2 percent chance to have a non-upheld allegation made against 
them. This one-in-four chance of a non-upheld allegation provides credit towards the notion that 
teachers are reacting to a credible threat and not acting irrationally. This is especially true given 
that to be covered a teacher needs to be a union member at the time of the alleged allegation and 
when the allegation is made. As union dues and the decision to remain in a union are made on an 
annual basis, the annual probability of a non-upheld allegation being made is 0.69 percent. 
3. Demand for Union Membership Model
A: Model and Assumptions 
Teacher unions provide a unique service in the form of legal advice and protection against 
allegations made by students. I model union membership as form of legal insurance that teachers 
Immigration/Asylum Support Services, and Other. There are five abuse categories: Physical, Emotional, Sexual, 
Neglect and Other.  
21
 The 16 outcome categories are: Not Upheld – No further action after initial consideration, Being unfounded, 
Being unsubstantiated, Being malicious, Acquittal; Police Involvement – Criminal investigation, Conviction; 
Disciplinary Procedures – Disciplinary Action, Suspension, Dismissal, Resignation, Cessation of use, Inclusion 
on barred/restricted employment list; Referral - Section 47 investigation, Referral to DCSF, Referral to 
Regulatory Body.      
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can chose to pay for with annual dues. The benefit is that the expected outcome in the event of an 
allegation is better if the teacher is a member of a trade union.  
To formalise this decision process, the following assumptions are made. There are multiple 
types of teachers that vary in their risk aversion, their actual risk of allegations being made against 
them and other characteristics that are correlated with the net benefits of union membership. All of 
these teacher types are summarised by a term 𝜃𝜃.22  
A teacher’s utility is a function of consumption income 𝑌𝑌 and type 𝜃𝜃,  𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌, 𝜃𝜃), which has 
decreasing marginal benefits from income. Teachers are employed in schools which are ‘open 
shops,’ so union and non-union members are both employed and earn the same wages 𝑤𝑤 > 0. There 
is only one trade union, and, if a teacher decides to join the union, she pays annual cost c>0. 
Therefore, teacher wages can either be spent on union fees or left as consumption income, 𝑤𝑤 =𝑌𝑌 − 𝑐𝑐. 
If an allegation is made against a teacher, the teacher incurs cost 𝑎𝑎 > 𝑐𝑐 regardless of the 
subsequent outcome, reflecting the social costs and potential damage to career prospects. Similarly, 
there is an additional cost 𝑙𝑙 if a teacher is found guilty of an allegation such that 𝑙𝑙 ≫ 𝑐𝑐, reflecting 
the high cost of being put on List 99 or for more serious offences being imprisoned. We can now 
rank utilities for any given state of the world for all types 𝜃𝜃:  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛(𝑤𝑤, 𝜃𝜃) > 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐, 𝜃𝜃) > 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑎𝑎,𝜃𝜃) > 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐, 𝜃𝜃) > 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙, 𝜃𝜃) > 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑙𝑙, 𝜃𝜃)   (1) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛 and  𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢 are the utilities of non-members and members respectively with no allegation 
against them. The second superscript relates to the outcome of the allegation: 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛 is the utility after 
winning a case; 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛, losing a case. These utility levels depend on union status. For union members, 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 = 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎, 𝜃𝜃) and 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 = 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙, 𝜃𝜃). Non-union members utilities 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 follow a similar structure but do not incur membership cost 𝑐𝑐. Therefore, the state with the 
highest utility is a non-member with no allegations against them 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛 and the worst state is a union 
member who lost their case 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛. 
The teacher type θ can contain a taste for investing in a public good, such as union membership, 
independent of the allegation threat. For simplicity, I assume tastes for union membership cannot 
be large enough to change the direction of these preference inequalities. 
22
 Note that this allows for some types of teachers to potentially commit offences. If all teachers were innocent all 
the time, there would be no market for insurance as all teachers would be presumed not guilty. 
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The perceived subjective probability of an allegation being made against a teacher with 
characteristics 𝑥𝑥 from region 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑡𝑡 is 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1). This an increasing function of previous news 
stories s in the first derivative and negative in the second, reflecting the diminishing marginal 
impact of the news stories in a region.23 By having 𝛿𝛿 be a function only of news stories and not 
current union membership, I assume that there is no strategic behaviour by the accuser (e.g., being 
less likely to accuse a union teacher), as students will not likely know the union status of any given 
teacher.   
If an allegation is made, the probability of a teacher being exonerated is 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥) which is 
increasing in the amount of resources devoted to their defence x. Therefore, the expected utility of 
a teacher once an allegation is made, 𝑍𝑍, is a convex combination of winning and losing utilities 
given their union membership status. 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛 = 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + (1 − 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛))𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (2) 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 = 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢)𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + (1 − 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢))𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 
The individual teacher has only one decision to make: to join the union or not. A marginal 
individual of type 𝜃𝜃∗ is indifferent between joining a union or not, and so have no marginal benefits 
of joining: when 𝑏𝑏 = 0. 𝑏𝑏 = 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 0   𝑏𝑏 = �𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠)𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 + �1 − 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠)�𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐,  𝜃𝜃∗)� − �𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠)𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛 + �1 − 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠)�𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤,  𝜃𝜃∗)� = 0  (3) 
For a marginal member to exist, it must hold that that the expected utility, once an allegation is 
made, is greater for a union member than for a non-union member (𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 > 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛), as 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐,  𝜃𝜃∗) <𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤,  𝜃𝜃∗), and 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠) is independent of membership status. This provides the first implication of the 
model. Since the only difference between 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 and 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛 comes from  𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥), if there are any union 
members, then we require that unions provide more resources for defence 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢) > 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛). This 
result reflects the restrictions that exist for teachers in employing private representation, making it 
difficult to transform income into defensive resources efficiently. 
Taking the first derivative of (3) with respect to the number of news stories, it can also be 
shown that the expected gain from membership for the marginal member is an increasing function 
of news reports. 
23
 The perceived threat can also be a function of other factors in addition to news stories, such as the actual number 
of allegations. Section 5.4 investigates the use of this and other less salient measure of threat. Imposing a linear 
relationship between news stories and the decision to join a union provides qualitatively similar results.  
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝛿𝛿′(𝑠𝑠)(𝑍𝑍 𝑢𝑢 − 𝑍𝑍 𝑛𝑛) + 𝛿𝛿′(𝑠𝑠)[𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤,  𝜃𝜃∗) − 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐,  𝜃𝜃∗)] (4) 
Given the assumptions that 𝛿𝛿′(𝑠𝑠) > 0, 𝑍𝑍 𝑢𝑢 − 𝑍𝑍 𝑛𝑛 > 0 and (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐,  𝜃𝜃∗) < 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤,  𝜃𝜃∗), it follows that 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑>0. For an indifferent teacher with taste for risk 𝜃𝜃∗, the marginal benefit of unions is increasing 
the number of news stories. 
B: Comparative Statics 
I now present comparative statics to illustrate that a teacher of type 𝜃𝜃∗ would choose to be a 
union member when the perceived risk of an allegation is high, but not when the perceived risk is 
low.  
Panel A of Figure 2 shows her utility function, 𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌, 𝜃𝜃∗), and the utility levels specified in (1). 
A teacher will make her decision by evaluating her utility if no allegations are made, her expected 
utility if an allegation is made, and the probability of that allegation being made in the first place. 
The expected utility of a union member once an allegation has been made is represented by the 
chord linking the points  𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 and 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 (similarly for the points  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 for non-members). 
The exact point on the chord is determined by the probability of success, 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥). As 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢) > 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛), 
the union member will be higher up their chord than the non-union member, so we can plot 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 >𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛.  
A union (non-union) teacher will compare their outcomes should no allegation be made 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐,𝜃𝜃∗ ) (𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤,𝜃𝜃∗ )) to her expected utility in the event of an allegation 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 (𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛). Therefore, 
the expected utility before an allegation is made is a combination of these two outcomes. These 
combinations for union and non-union members can be seen in Panels B and C of Figure 2. The 
lower chord that links the intersection of the utility curve with 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛 to the intersection with 𝑤𝑤 
represents the expected utility space of a teacher who is not a union member. Similarly, before an 
allegation is made, a union teacher is at a point on the upper chord between 𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐,𝜃𝜃∗ ) and 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢. 
The location of a teacher along this new chord is dependent on her expectations of an allegation 
being made against her. Panel B of Figure 2 shows a high threat scenario, 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠)=0.5, and the 
individual will be at the midpoint of each chord. With this high perceived threat level, the expected 
utility from membership is greater than that of non-membership, 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛. In contrast, Panel C 
shows that the same teacher with the same taste for risk and type 𝜃𝜃∗ and same amount of union 
dues c would choose not to be in a union if the risk level were low, 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠)=0.1. This basic example 
demonstrates that the demand for union membership is directly related to the perceived threat of 
allegations, 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥).  
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C. Econometric Specification 
This basic model of rational decision making by the teacher forms the basis of the estimation 
strategy. A teacher i from region j in time period t will choose to join the union if the expected 
benefits of joining the union are positive: 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 − 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 > 0. Each of these expected utilities will 
be a function of many factors in addition to perceived threat of an allegation being made and will 
be related to the teachers type 𝜃𝜃. This can be summarised by the two following equations. 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 = 𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 + 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 𝛿𝛿�𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1� + 𝛾𝛾𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 + 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢  (5) 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 + 𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛 𝛿𝛿�𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1� + 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 + 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛   (6) 
where 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1) is the perceived threat in region j in time period t caused by news stories s in the 
previous period. The expected benefits for a union member per unit of perceived threat is 
represented by 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢. The remaining parameters account for the other characteristics of a teacher type 𝜃𝜃. The general benefits for being a union (non-union) member for any individual in any time period 
is 𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢 (𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛). The benefits of union (non-union) membership can also vary according to a vector of 
observable individual characteristics  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, such as age, qualifications, sector of employment and 
gender. The additional gains for being a union member in region j, are represented by 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢, which 
could reflect taste for unions in a particular region. 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 allows for varying gains from union 
membership each year, which impacts all teachers in the same way, such as any general decline in 
union power. Individuals also have an idiosyncratic taste for union (non-union) membership that 
varies overtime, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥. The probability that any individual i in region j at time period t will be a trade 
union member is 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 �, using the standard result (McFadden, 1976) we can combine 
equations 5 and 6 into the following expression: 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 � =  exp (𝛼𝛼+𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌�𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1�+𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗+𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗)1+𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒(𝛼𝛼+𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌�𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1�+𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗+𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗) (7) 
where each parameter is now the marginal benefit for individual i to join the union (e.g., 𝜌𝜌 = 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 −𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛). As I do not have a measure of perceived risk, only the incidence of media stories, I am not 
able to separately identify the perceived threat from each story 𝛿𝛿 and the marginal gain 𝜌𝜌 from a 
unit of perceived threat. Instead, I will estimate the combination of the two, the expected marginal 
gain for union members per story.  
Given that, by assumption,  𝛿𝛿�𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1� is decreasing and concave, it will be parameterised into the 
effect per story 𝛽𝛽1, and its square 𝛽𝛽2. The demand for union membership can then be estimated 
using a logistic regression, where the parameters of interest are 𝛽𝛽1 + 2𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝚥𝚥𝑥𝑥−1������ representing the 
15 
marginal effect of an additional story at the mean news coverage on union membership, of the 
form:  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−12 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 + 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 (8) 
where U is an indicator variable if individual i in period t is a union member or not, and 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1 is the 
number of stories in region j in time period t-1. I include a series of regional and year fixed effects, 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 and 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 respectively. This specification assumes that media coverage of region j has no impact 
on the perceived benefits of union membership in a different region. To allow for correlation in the 
residual demand for union membership, the standard errors throughout the paper are clustered at 
this regional level.24 To allow for spillovers and to obtain estimates of the total impact of news 
stories on union membership, I will estimate an alternate specification which additionally includes 
a measure for total news stories nationally each year, 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥, and replace the year effects term with a 
national time trend 𝜑𝜑: 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−12 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥−12 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 + 𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥   (9) 
Following similar reasoning that teachers are more likely to be affected by news stories 
originating in their region, one may expect certain stories to have a larger impact on certain teachers 
who share characteristics with the teacher involved in the media coverage. For example, a news 
story involving false allegations against a male teacher may be more relevant to other male teachers 
compared to female teachers. I investigate this by allowing the threat to vary by the characteristics 
of the teacher in the story 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 and estimate the impact when the characteristics of the teacher are 
the same or different to the characteristics of the story, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑋𝑋′𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥. Any 
differences in the effect may be due either to the threat of a given story generates being greater, 𝛿𝛿�𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1� >  𝛿𝛿�𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥′𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1� when 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑋𝑋′𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1, or to the expected marginal gain 
24
 Due to the relatively small number of regions (20), there is reason for concern due as the standard cluster 
robust variance estimator (CRVE) is based on the number of clusters going to infinity. A typical solution would 
be to use wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008). However, Kline and Santos (2012) state that this is not 
appropriate when implementing maximum likelihood estimation, and propose a score-bootstrap to be used in its 
stead. A follow-up paper by Roodman et. al. (2018) claims that this score-bootstrap cannot fully capture the 
nonlinearity of the estimator in nonlinear models and suggest that “score-bootstrap not be relied upon without 
evidence that it works well in the case of interest.” Therefore, I have replicated the main results with score-
bootstrap p-values and found that it leads to very similar results, indicating that the inference using CRVE is 
robust (Appendix Table 3). 
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driven by the story being larger, 𝜌𝜌𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1 > 𝜌𝜌𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1. Again, I cannot separately identify these 
effects but will instead estimate the marginal effect of a similar or less similar story as follows: 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥′𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥′𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−12 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 + 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 (10) 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
A. Union Membership 
Information on teachers and their union status is obtained from the Quarterly Labour Force 
Surveys (QLFS) over the period 1992 through 2010. The QLFS is conducted by the Office of 
National Statistics and follows approximately 60,000 households every quarter. Individuals are 
asked for employment and personal characteristics. This allows me to condition on factors that 
have been shown to be important determinants of union status (Machin, 2006): age, tenure, gender, 
occupation, public sector employee, qualifications and region. Information relating to union 
membership is collected only in the autumn quarter, so only observations from this quarter can be 
used.25 The estimates are generated over the period 1993 to 2010, as some individual characteristics 
are not available in 1992.  
Teachers are identified through three-digit occupation codes, which allows teachers who work 
in primary schools, secondary schools and Special Schools to be separately identified. This results 
in a final sample used for estimation of 30,392 teachers, with on average 1,782 teachers per year, 
827 of whom teach at primary schools, 817 teach at secondary schools and the remaining 138 teach 
at specialist schools. Summary statistics of teachers in comparison to the workforce in general can 
be found in Table 3. As one may expect, teachers differ considerably, 88.6 percent are employed 
in the public sector compared with 24.6 percent in the wider economy. Teachers are also more 
likely to be female (72.5 percent versus 47.5 percent) and be a graduate (74.3 percent versus 18 
percent). Regarding the main characteristic of interest, the unionisation rate of teachers is 84 
percent compared with 27.6 percent for non-teachers and 59.4 percent in the public sector as a 
whole. This paper uses the twenty detailed Government Office Regions as the region of analysis, 
25
 The QLFS is a continuously rotating panel of households interviewing over five quarters, and information 
relating to union membership is obtained every autumn. Therefore, a quarter of individuals are asked twice about 
their union status. Unfortunately, the number of repeated teacher observations is too small to run auxiliary analysis 
on this sample. The standard errors are clustered at the regional level and no teacher in the sample is observed 
changing regions between surveys. 
17 
which is derived from Local Authority residence. These larger regions allow for news stories to 
have wider impacts outside of their immediate vicinity.26 
B. Media Coverage 
Many different factors may influence the perceived threat of an allegation being made against 
a teacher. This paper uses the impact of media coverage originating in the region in which teacher 
i resides as a measure for overall threat. In order for this to be exogenous, I require two assumptions. 
First, the impact of moral hazard of teachers committing more incidents when being a union 
member cannot be sufficient to generate an increase in the number of news stories. Workplace 
health insurance schemes have been found to illicit moral hazard by workers (Kruger, 1990; Meyer 
et. al., 1995). One may hope that the actions of teachers would not be reactive, but, for the number 
of news stories to remain exogenous, we would only require the weaker assumption of the incidents 
of news stories not changing. Therefore, the main measure is only going to count coverage where 
the teacher is found to be innocent and so could not be driven by moral hazard. Second, areas with 
high union density cannot be more likely to generate news stories. Without these assumptions, the 
incidence of media reports is endogenous, as higher union membership would increase the number 
of stories. These assumptions are tested by means of an event study in the robustness section, where 
failure would result in increases in the likelihood of membership before the news story event. 
It would be very difficult to have a measure of all news coverage. Therefore, like other papers 
(Carroll, 2003; Lamla and Lein, 2008; van der Wiel, 2009), I will be using the number of articles 
in national newspapers as a proxy for all media coverage. The data on news stories is obtained from 
LexisNexis, an online database of media published in the UK. In order to have a consistent measure 
of press coverage, only newspapers that were present in LexisNexis throughout the entire period 
were used for the analysis.27 I searched for all articles which contained the word ‘teacher’ in the 
headline and included any of the following terms (or derivatives) in the headline or preliminary 
paragraphs of the main text (as defined by Lexis Nexis); teacher, damages, sued, litigation, 
allegation, jail, court, dismissed or fired, over the period September 1991 to August 2010. Using 
the date of the QLFS interview and media publication date, I allocate media coverage from the 
26
 Use of the restricted access QLFS with Local Authority information is not possible before 2002. These files 
have been converted to the new calendar framework and as union questions were only asked in the Autumn they 
have been removed.  
27
 Newspapers that were omitted due to only appearing for part of the sample period were: The Morning Star, The 
Express, The Daily Telegraph, Sunday Express, Sunday Telegraph, The News of the World, and The People. 
Their exclusion does not change the interpretation of the results. Results are available upon request. This also 
prevents the use of local newspapers, as they only started appearing in the LexisNexis data from 2002, and not 
consistently across regions.  
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twelve months prior to the interview to the teacher. The length of this recall period is varied in the 
robustness section.  
Each of these news stories were categorised by rubric (a full description of the categories can 
be found in Appendix Table 2). This coding frame classified news stories into four levels according 
to how relevant they would be to influence a teacher’s perceived benefit of joining a union: 
Extremely Relevant (e.g., teacher found innocent and case thrown out of court); Highly Relevant 
(e.g., a teacher currently on trial); Little Relevance (e.g., guilty of a lesser offence); Not Relevant 
(e.g., teacher admits guilt of extreme sexual abuse). This effectively means that the more “relevant” 
articles are measures of less bad behaviour (or no bad behaviour at all), but are “relevant” to 
someone who worries that they might be falsely accused. Moreover, counts of relevant stories 
would not be impacted by moral hazard by teachers. In contrast, stories involving teachers 
admitting bad behaviour are coded as low relevance, including any moral hazard on behalf of 
teachers. Note that it is possible for a single case to appear in different levels as the newspaper 
stories develop over time. In total, 1,709 stories were coded, of which 623 were classified as 
extremely relevant and 548 as highly relevant. To limit the subjective nature of classifying the news 
stories, I follow Woolley (2000) in pre-defining the rubric before the search was conducted. 
The newspaper stories are further categorised by story type according to whether they involve: 
Allegations, Being Sued, Suing, Being Attacked, Criminal Activity, Being Sacked, Employment 
Tribunal and Teacher Union Activity. For the main analysis, I define an accusation story to be one 
of the following story types ‘Allegations’, ‘Being Sued’, and ‘Criminal Activity’, with parallel 
analysis using all story types. The total number of stories of this type in the balanced panel of 
newspapers that are extremely or highly relevant is 439. Table 4 summarises the total number of 
stories by level and type. Figure 3 shows the large increase in the number of news stories since the 
late 1990’s, alongside the growth in union density.  
In addition to the relevance and nature of the news stories, I also extracted information on the 
type teacher involved in the story and its region of origin (Table 5). The name of the teacher, or 
pronoun used in each story was used to determine the gender of the teacher. References to the 
school name or the age of the pupils involved determined if the teacher was teaching in a Primary 
or Secondary school. In this way I was able to assign gender in 96.6% of stories and school level 
in 82.4% of stories. For stories where the gender or school level of the teacher were not mentioned, 
the story was not counted for either group. Stories where no region is mentioned are counted only 
towards the total number of stories nationally; 82% of these stories are trade unions highlighting 
the growing issue of false allegations being made against teachers. Stories involving secondary 
school teachers are the most common, representing 66.3% of highly relevant stories. The balance 
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between the genders is more equal with 50.7% of highly relevant stories involving male teachers 
and 46.5% involving female teachers.   
5. Results
A. Aggregate Trends 
Between 1993 and 2005, the union density amongst teachers increased by 10.5 percentage 
points, whilst amongst non-teachers it fell by 6 percentage points (Figure 1). This increase in 
unionisation rate has occurred across all teacher age groups, which implies that this growth rate is 
not solely due to improvement in recruitment rates amongst newly qualified teachers but a general 
increase in demand for union membership across all teaching age groups (Appendix Figure 1). 
Union density started to decline after the government restriction on media reporting in 2005 (Figure 
3). This decline was not reversed with the increase in unemployment rate associated with the Great 
Recession from 2008 onwards, which would be expected if individuals joined unions as a form of 
unemployment insurance Blanchflower et. al. (1990). In summary these aggregate trends are 
indicative that there has been a general increase in demand for union membership among teachers 
since 1993, which peaked in 2005 and trends with the number of news stories nationally.    
B. Main Results 
We now turn to analyse the aggregate trends of Figure 3 through the regression framework 
developed in Section 3. The basic estimating equation is given by specification (8). I use the number 
of national news stories that originated in a region from the previous twelve months as a shock to 
the perceived threat of an accusation being made. These within-region logistic estimates are 
presented in Table 6. To aid interpretation, the estimates have been transformed from the logistic 
parameters to the marginal effect multiplied by 100, and so can be thought of as a percentage point 
change in probability (e.g., a coefficient of 0.5 would reflect a half a percentage point increase in 
the probability of union membership).  
Column 1 of Panel A shows a positive significant raw correlation of 0.548 between the number 
of extremely relevant stories involving an accusation originating in a region on the likelihood of 
union membership. Column 2 conditions on individual characteristics, with little change in the 
coefficient which implying that there is little correlation between the incidence of news stories and 
these characteristics (0.588). Column 3 additionally allows for varying union demand in each 
region and is therefore using the within region variation in news stories over time. The final column 
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additionally includes year effects which allows for the average unionisation rate to increase over 
time, which is the smallest of the estimates at 0.502 but remains significant at the 5 percent level.  
The quadratic term is negative and significant, implying that each additional story beyond the 
first has a smaller impact. Evaluating the marginal effect at the mean, I find that each additional 
highly relevant story increases the probability of being a union member by 0.425 percentage points. 
Panel B shows the same specifications on the same sample, but uses both extremely and highly 
relevant stories, instead of just the most relevant. The coefficients do not change significantly, but, 
due to the additional variation, the standard errors are smaller. Therefore, all remaining analyses 
employ this measure of relevant stories.28 29 
The final panel of Table 6 reports the impact of stories relating to teachers defined as having 
little to no relevance for an innocent teacher on union membership. This serves two purposes. First, 
one may be concerned that these effects could be a spurious correlation between the number of 
stories about teachers generally in a region and union status. Second, insurance from allegations 
means there is the possibility of moral hazard among union teachers with malevolent preferences. 
However, the rubric codes stories of teachers found guilty of an allegation to be of Little to No 
Relevance. Therefore, testing for a relationship between union membership and the number of low 
relevance stories is approaching a test for moral hazard. Reassuringly, Panel C of Table 6 shows 
no relationship between stories of Little to No Relevance and union membership.30  
28
 I have run a parallel set of estimations which instead use a measure of news impact, derived from the number 
of words per story normalised by mean story length in that newspaper in that year. These results mirror these 
findings and are available upon request.  
29
 As described in Section 3, I allow for a decreasing marginal impact of stories through the inclusion of a squared 
term. This is important as there are a handful stories that created a large amount of national press coverage over 
the course of a year, producing media counts more than two standard deviations above the mean. Appendix Table 
4 presents estimates from five different functional forms for media coverage; linear; linear capped at the 95% 
percentile; inverse hyperbolic sign (which approximates to logarithmic but can include zero), capped inverse 
hyperbolic sign, and quadratic. With the exception of the uncapped-linear specification all the specifications are 
positive significant and not statistically significantly different from each other at the 95 percent level. This 
highlights the importance of not enforcing constant impact of media coverage.  
30
 Another concern may stem from the subjective nature of the news story classifications. All news stories 
matched the search terms were categorised, but not all are directly relevant to the hypothesis of the paper. In 
keeping with this hypothesis of teachers demanding union membership for insurance reasons, I am only counting 
stories which involve accusations (‘Allegations’, ‘Being Sued’, and ‘Criminal Activity’). Appendix Table 5 
repeats the analysis using all news story types and shows that the effect is muted but remains significant. The table 
also presents estimates successively removing types of news, and the impact of each type of news story. This 
shows that the effects are driven by stories about allegations. Stories about teachers being attacked are statistically 
significant, but their removal from the total story count has limited impact due to their rarity. For the remainder 
of the analysis, I use the broader definition of stories about accusations. 
21 
These estimates do not capture the total impact of news stories annually on national 
membership, as they are using the variation at the regional level whilst accounting for national year 
effects. This is estimating only the relative effect of a news story originating in that region 
compared to other regions. To obtain a national impact, I replace the year effects terms with a 
national linear time trend. The total number of stories nationally per year parameter reflects the 
additional growth due to media coverage in excess of the long run unionisation trend. The 
corresponding estimates are found in Table 7. The number of the most relevant stories nationally 
has an additional impact above and beyond the number of regional stories, although the impact is 
smaller (0.108, versus 0.485). Using the average number of stories locally and nationally I calculate 
the mean total effect of newspaper stories on union demand. Compared to years with no relevant 
news stories, the mean number of stories in the past year increases the probability of union 
membership by 0.98 percentage points above the average growth rate.31 
C. Media Impact by Relevance of Coverage 
The model describes a teacher’s decision process in choosing to become a union member, 
highlighting the role of the threat of allegation driven by news stories on the marginal benefit of 
joining the union. If a teacher shares more characteristics with the teacher in the story one may 
expect that the story is more relevant in her updating process.  
Table 8 presents results according to the school type the teacher works for (primary school or 
secondary school) in the columns and by the school type reported in the media in the rows. To 
simplify the presented results, I report the marginal impact of stories at mean, conditioning on 
individual characteristics and year and regional effects (original estimates appear in Online 
Appendix Table 1). Column 1 uses the subsample of secondary school teachers; Column 2, primary 
school teachers. Panel A shows that the estimates of all relevant news stories, whether school type 
was mentioned or not. It shows that secondary school teachers react to media coverage, but there 
is no significant reaction from primary school teachers. This finding coincides with there being 
more relevant stories involving secondary school teachers (from Table 3: 285 secondary stories 
versus 90 primary stories).  
Panels B and C instead use only the stories involving secondary and primary school teachers 
respectively. I find that demand for union membership amongst secondary school teachers 
significantly reacts to each story involving other secondary school teachers (0.892 percentage 
31 Appendix Table 6 presents the results sequentially dropping one region at a time from the sample. The 
estimates move slightly in each case, but they tell a consistent story with an effect size around 0.37 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of being a union member per story. 
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points) but not to stories involving primary school teachers (Column 1). For primary school 
teachers, for whom there are far fewer stories, neither effect is statistically significant; however, 
the coefficient relating to primary school stories is higher than the one for secondary schools. These 
results are replicated in Columns 3 and 4, which instead use all relevant news stories, not just those 
relating to accusations. As before, this produces similar results to the highly relevant stories, in 
which secondary school teachers react more in general and react more to secondary school stories 
than primary school stories. With this broader news story definition, I find a marginally significant 
effect of primary news stories on primary school teachers. 
Table 9 has the same structure as Table 8 but focuses on the similarity of the teachers’ gender 
to that of the story. We see that only female teachers react significantly to relevant news stories in 
general. This could be indicative of female teachers being more risk averse in their type 𝜃𝜃, so, for 
any given increase in perceived threat, the increase in demand for insurance would be larger. Once 
we examine the impact by story type, male teachers do significantly react to news stories involving 
other male teachers (0.587) but not to those relating to female teachers (-0.070). Female teachers 
also react more to stories involving male teachers rather than female teachers (0.886, 0.398).32 
These findings are repeated using all story types (Columns 3 and 4), rather than those just relating 
to accusations against the teacher and produce similar results.   
With the exception of female teachers, the heterogeneity by school type and gender shows that 
individuals who share more characteristics with the story react more strongly. Although these 
differences are not always statistically significant, they suggest that something specific about the 
nature of the stories is driving demand and not a spurious correlation. There are two primary 
channels for this heterogeneity. First, this might be rational as the news story would be 
indicative of higher future allegation risk for teachers with the specific characteristics. Second, 
teachers might react more strongly as such news stories are more salient even though the news 
story might not be indicative of differential increases in allegation risks between teacher 
characteristics. 
To examine the first channel, I test if the first occurrence of a particular story and type 
(region, school type, or gender) is predictive of similar first occurrences of stories in the next 
year. Any significant positive correlation implies that teachers may be reacting rationally to an 
increased threat, assuming news stories are a reliable and stable measure of accusations. If 
32
 A possible explanation for these results is that female teachers, despite ostensibly having more in common with 
other female teachers mentioned in the press, may believe the incidence of false allegations to be higher in cases 
involving men and therefore react more to these types of stories. 
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journalists are more likely to report on a certain story type because there was a similar story 
the year before, then any effect could be interpreted as an increase in the threat of an allegation 
being reported in the news.  
Table 10 presents estimates from five OLS regressions between the number of new news 
stories in a region and the number of new news stories in the same region in the subsequent 
year. This is estimated at the regional level conditional on year and regional effects. We see 
that for every new story there are 0.34 new stories in the following year. Panels B and C again 
split the stories by school level and teacher gender respectively, testing if there is a link between 
the types of stories reported in subsequent years. Column 1 of Panel B presents how the number 
of new stories involving primary school teachers significantly increases by 0.12 for each new 
story involving a primary teacher in the previous year, but insignificantly by 0.04 for new 
stories involving secondary school teachers. Again, the amount of new news stories involving 
secondary school teachers significantly relates to the number of news stories about secondary 
schools, but not primary schools.  
For gender, we find that the number of new stories about males in the previous year is 
significantly positively related to the number of stories relating to male and female teachers. 
However, the stories involving female teachers in the previous year is not significantly related 
to the number of news stories regarding males or females in the next year, although both have 
a positive coefficient. This could rationalise the lack of reactions of female teachers to stories 
about teachers in the year before. 
To recap, the incidence of new story types follows that of the impact of media stories on the 
likelihood of union membership. The incidence of primary school stories is correlated with the 
future number of primary school stories and union membership, and similarly for secondary 
schools. The incidence of new male stories is correlated with the future number of stories of both 
genders and union membership. In contrast, new stories involving female teachers is related to 
neither the number of stories in the next year nor the likelihood of union membership of either 
gender. Regardless of the nature of threat to which they are responding, actual allegations or the 
reporting of allegations, this result implies that teachers are responding rationally to the occurrences 
of news stories in their region. This does not exclude the possibility that teachers also react more 
strongly to stories that they share characteristics with because they are also more salient. 
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D. Media Impact on Other Occupations 
As a robustness check that these reports are reflecting a change to the perceived threat to 
teachers and not to general union demand, I now estimate the impact of news stories on individuals 
from other related and unrelated occupations. Table 11 shows the impact of these stories on 
occupations that are increasingly dissimilar to teachers: educational assistants, higher education 
professionals, non-teacher public sector graduates, and non-teacher graduates. The coefficients of 
interest are not significant for any of the other occupational groups. However, there is evidence of 
an effect on education assistants which has a larger marginal effect at the mean compared to the 
teachers but is insignificantly determined (0.622 versus 0.377 percentage points). Moreover, the 
insignificant effects decrease in size as the occupations become less similar to teachers, with the 
effect of teacher news stories being a tenth of the size on non-teacher graduates in general.  
E. Longer Run Media Impact 
All the estimates presented so far have been estimating the impact of media coverage that 
occurred in the twelve months prior to the interview, thereby restricting the impact of news that 
occurred before this time to have no influence on an individual’s decision. Table 12 presents the 
impact of regional highly relevant media in six-month periods up to 36 months before the survey 
interview. I find that individuals react in a similar way to stories from the last six to twelve months, 
and effects continue to exist from stories that happened between a year and eighteen months ago, 
but stories prior to that have no significant impact. This implies that, for those marginal members 
who were otherwise indifferent to joining, being a union member is not an absorbing state. 
Alternatively, it could be interpreted that if a potential union member hasn’t joined within the first 
eighteen months of a story being published then that story is not going to impact her decision.33     
In addition to extending the period over which previous news stories can impact current 
unionisation rates, I use this event study approach to test an important assumption: that media 
stories are not endogenous. One can imagine if a union has more members in a region at a point in 
time, that union would be able to generate more news stories or publicity. This would generate a 
reverse causality (i.e., increased union membership increases the number of news stories). To test 
for this possibility, I estimate the impact of news stories that have yet to be reported on current 
membership status. Positive significant estimates of future stories would imply that increased union 
density generates more stories. This could be generated also through increased likelihood of moral 
33
 Appendix Table 7 shows the impact of extending the period of analysis from six months out to 36 months out 
in six-month steps.  
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hazard by the teachers. Figure 4 presents an event study showing the impact of news stories 
occurring up to 36 months the after the interview and 30 months before. We again see past news 
stories affecting the current likelihood of union membership, but, importantly, stories that have yet 
to occur have no significant impact.  
Having established that there are effects of news stories up to eighteen months beforehand, I 
now estimate the total impact of media coverage on union membership over time. Allowing for 
separate effects for the amount of news stories in each six-month period up to 36 months prior to 
the QLFS interview, both nationally and regionally, I predict the probability of union membership 
for the years between 1993 and 2010. These estimates are plotted in Figure 5. The predicted 
probabilities from the model fit closely to the plotted series of actual union density, rarely diverging 
from the 95% confidence interval band. This model provides a better fit to the data compared to a 
specification that omits perceived threat parameters. This series is also plotted in Figure 5 and fails 
to reflect the growth in density from 1998 and the fall that occurred post 2005, the year in which 
new regulations were introduced that made it harder to report on stories before they arrived to court. 
To estimate the aggregate impact that increased perceived threat has had on union 
membership, I use these estimates to re-predict union membership for each year fixing the total 
news coverage to zero. This provides a counterfactual time series of what would have occurred had 
there been no increase in the threat of allegations. The figure shows that, without media coverage, 
union membership would have been relatively stable at around 81 percent from 1996 onwards, 
instead of steadily rising to 87.5 percent. In the period from 1999 through 2009, union density is 
significantly greater than estimates from where there was no media coverage. Between 2002 and 
2008, this estimated difference in union membership is 5 percentage points.34    
6. Conclusions
This paper examines the role that the threat of accusations has had in the demand for trade 
union membership amongst teachers in the UK. I find that teachers from regions where news stories 
of accusations against other teachers originate are more likely to join a union in the following 
eighteen months. For every ten stories in a region, a teacher is 4 percent more likely to join. These 
effects are larger if teachers share characteristics with the teacher mentioned in the story (e.g., 
34
 The paper uses media coverage as the determinant of the threat of an accusation alternatively. It may be 
the case that these news stories reflect a growing number of actual allegations. Using the data on actual allegations, 
over a shorter time period with fewer regions, I find a positive correlation between news stories and allegations. 
However, in a horserace between these two on a greatly reduced sample (3,399 observations), only news stories 
are significant (Appendix Table 8).  
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secondary school teachers react more to stories involving other secondary school teachers; similarly 
for male teachers). That the incidence of new news stories making the national news follows these 
same patterns, coupled with the finding that the average teacher over a career of 35 years has a 24 
percent chance to have a non-upheld allegation made against them, is evidence that these actions 
are rational. 
While national newspaper coverage is not a complete measure of media exposure, we should 
think of it as a proxy for media coverage more generally. It accurately predicts the changes in union 
membership since 1993. Setting media stories to zero throughout the period, I forecast that union 
membership would remain steady at approximately 81 percent rather than increasing to 87 percent 
as seen in the data and, therefore, accounts for 45 percent of the growth in union density between 
1992 and 2010. 
This paper provides evidence as to why individuals choose to join a trade union even if they have 
the opportunity to free-ride on the traditional benefits of union membership, such as higher pay and 
better working conditions. Unions offering a private excludable service can maintain demand for 
membership, as long as demand for that service remains intact. The policy implication is that the 
introduction of ‘right to work’ legislation will not necessarily reduce demand for union membership 
to zero. Additionally, there may be an increasing unmet demand for union membership in 
previously under-unionised service sectors where the threat of litigation is increasing. Finally, if 
regulations are introduced that protect individuals from allegations, then the demand for union 
services, and hence membership, will decline. 
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Figures  
Figure 1: Union Density Time Series by Occupation 
Source: QLFS 1992-2010. Proportion of all adults reporting an occupation who are union members. 
Teachers defined by occupational codes 2314, 2315, 2316
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Figure 2: Illustration of Union Membership Decision 
Panel A: Utility curve of teacher 𝑼𝑼(𝒀𝒀,𝜽𝜽∗) with wages 𝒘𝒘, union dues 𝒄𝒄. 
Panel B: Expected utilities of teacher 𝑼𝑼(𝒀𝒀,𝜽𝜽∗) with a high perceived risk 𝜹𝜹(𝒔𝒔)=0.5 
Panel C: Expected utilities of teacher 𝑼𝑼(𝒀𝒀,𝜽𝜽∗) with a low perceived risk 𝜹𝜹(𝒔𝒔)=0.1 
Notes: 𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 (𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛) is the utility of a union 
member who has had an allegation made 
against them and won (lost) their case. 
Similarly for non-members 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛). 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢  (𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛) represents the expected utility once 
an allegation has been made for a union (non-
union) member. 𝑎𝑎 represents the cost of an 
allegation and 𝑙𝑙 the additional cost of  being 
found guilty.  
Notes: 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢 (𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛) represents the expected 
utility of a union (non-union) member for a 
given threat level 𝜎𝜎(𝑠𝑠).  
When the risk is high δ(s)=0.5, at the 
midpoint of each cord, then 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛.  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 
Notes: 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢 (𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛) represents the expected 
utility of a union (non-union) member for a 
given threat level 𝜎𝜎(𝑠𝑠).  
When the risk is low δ(s)=0.1, teachers are at 
a higher point on each cord and  then 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢 >𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛.  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 
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Figure 3 Union Density and Relevant News Stories over time 
Source: QLFS 1992:2010, Lexis Nexus 1992-2010 Notes: Annual union density based on mean union 
membership of teachers based on QLFS reporting year. News story total based on total relevant news 
stories about teachers concerning Allegations; Being Sued, and Criminal Activity over a calendar year. 
Figure 4 Event Study of Union Membership and Media Coverage 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Predictions of probability union from a logit 
regression for each year. Impact in terms of percentage point impacts e.g. 1 is a 
percentage point increase. Allows separate effect of news stories regionally (and their 
square), for each six-month period up to 36 months post or prior to the interview.
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Figure 5 Predicted Union Density with and without Media Reports 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Predictions of union status from a logit regression, allowing separate effect of news stories 
regionally and nationally (and their square), for each six month period up to 36 months prior to the interview. The 
counterfactual estimates are generated with the same parameters apart from setting the media terms to zero. Accusation stories 
are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Stories Regionally is a count of the number of news stories 
that originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 6 months, 7-12 months, 13-18 months, 19-24 months, 25-
30 months, and 31-36months. Similarly, Stories Nationally is a count for the number of all news stories, including stories that 
could not be allocated to a specific region. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level.
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Table 1: Allegations by Employer and Type of Allegation 
Type of Allegation 
All Reporting Local Authorities 2007-2011 
Employer Physical Emotional Sexual Neglect Other Total 
Education 6,267 932 2,642 316 862 11,019 
Foster Carers 1,512 305 388 255 70 2,530 
Social Care 1,085 169 356 176 112 1,898 
Secure Estate 384 15 26 0 6 431 
Health 257 42 177 66 41 583 
Voluntary Youth Organisations 203 34 342 23 48 650 
Faith 177 8 96 1 12 294 
Police 142 33 72 9 12 268 
Immigration 39 2 39 6 0 86 
Connexions 14 4 14 3 5 40 
Youth Offending Teams 10 8 19 6 9 52 
Armed Forces 6 0 25 1 0 32 
Probation 5 0 2 1 0 8 
NSPCC 4 1 2 0 1 8 
CAFCASS 1 2 2 1 1 7 
Other 1,380 247 941 233 247 3,048 
Total by type 11,486 1,802 5,143 1,097 1,426 20,954 
Source: Freedom of Information Requests to English Local Authorities. Note: Lists of responding Local 
Authorities and balanced Panel of Local Authorities is in Appendix 1 
Table 2: Total Recorded Outcomes of Allegations 
Allegation Outcome 
All Reporting Local Authorities 2007-2011 
Not Upheld 
Police 
Involvement 
Disciplinary 
Procedures Referral Total 
Total  4,680 1,030 3,058 1,373 10,141 
Percent of total 46.1% 10.2% 30.2% 13.5% 
Source: Freedom of Information Act Requests to English Local Authorities. Notes: Not Upheld – No further action after initial 
consideration, Being unfounded, Being unsubstantiated, Being malicious, Acquittal ; Police Involvement – Criminal 
investigation, Conviction; Disciplinary Procedures – Disciplinary Action, Suspension, Dismissal, Resignation, Cessation of 
use, Inclusion on barred/restricted employment list; Referral - Section 47 investigation, Referral to DCSF, Referral to 
Regulatory Body. Total outcomes do not equal total number of cases as not all cases had an outcome in the last 12 months.  
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Table 3: Employee Summary Statistics 
Teachers All Employees 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Union Member 0.840 0.367 0.276 0.447 
Public Sector 0.886 0.317 0.246 0.431 
Male 0.275 0.447 0.525 0.499 
Full Time 0.786 0.410 0.738 0.440 
University Qualification 0.743 0.437 0.180 0.384 
A-Level Qualification 0.761 0.426 0.304 0.460 
Age 42.67 10.32 40.29 12.78 
Tenure 
less than 3 months 0.066 0.249 0.058 0.235 
3 months but less than 6 0.016 0.125 0.047 0.211 
6 months but less than 12 0.026 0.158 0.068 0.252 
1 year but less than 2 0.082 0.275 0.107 0.309 
2 years but less than 5 0.188 0.390 0.207 0.405 
5 years but less than 10 0.205 0.403 0.193 0.395 
10 years but less than 20 0.241 0.428 0.196 0.397 
20 years or more 0.176 0.381 0.123 0.329 
Government Region 
Tyne and Wear 0.015 0.122 0.018 0.132 
Rest of North East 0.025 0.155 0.024 0.154 
Greater Manchester 0.037 0.190 0.039 0.194 
Merseyside 0.022 0.145 0.019 0.138 
Rest of North West 0.049 0.217 0.050 0.218 
South Yorkshire 0.021 0.142 0.021 0.144 
West Yorkshire 0.038 0.191 0.037 0.190 
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside 0.028 0.165 0.029 0.167 
East Midlands 0.073 0.260 0.074 0.262 
West Midlands Metropolitan County 0.041 0.198 0.039 0.193 
Rest of West Midlands 0.048 0.213 0.050 0.218 
East of England 0.097 0.296 0.099 0.299 
Inner London 0.030 0.170 0.034 0.180 
Outer London 0.068 0.252 0.066 0.248 
South East 0.145 0.352 0.147 0.354 
South West 0.079 0.269 0.088 0.283 
Wales 0.050 0.217 0.046 0.208 
Strathclyde 0.039 0.193 0.035 0.185 
Rest of Scotland 0.057 0.232 0.055 0.228 
Northern Ireland 0.040 0.195 0.030 0.170 
Observations 30,392 988,256 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Autumn Survey, sample of all employees 18-64 Notes: Teachers defined as 
Standard Occupational Classification codes (1993-2000):233, 234, 235 and Standard Occupational 
Classification Codes (2001-2010): 2314,  2315, 2316 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics –News Coverage 1991-2010 
Story Type 
Panel A: All Newspaper Stories 
Relevance of Story  Allegations Being Sued Suing Being Attacked 
Criminal 
Activity Sacked 
Employment
Tribunal 
Union 
Activity Total 
Extremely Relevant 322 45 100 4 12 15 61 64 623 
Highly Relevant 179 28 52 45 53 36 43 112 548 
Little Relevance 155 12 3 19 123 14 12 56 394 
Not Relevant 55 1 2 10 68 4 0 4 144 
Total 711 86 157 78 256 69 116 236 1709 
Panel B: Balanced Newspaper Panel Stories 
Relevance of Story  Allegations Being Sued Suing Being Attacked 
Criminal 
Activity Sacked 
Employment
Tribunal 
Union 
Activity Total 
Extremely Relevant 222 27 78 3 6 9 48 48 441 
Highly Relevant 115 22 36 29 37 16 35 78 368 
Little Relevance 95 5 1 10 77 8 9 46 251 
Not Relevant 38 1 2 1 32 0 0 2 76 
Total 470 55 117 43 152 33 92 172 1136 
Source: LexisNexis 1991-2010. News search of national newspapers with the following term: headline(teacher) and court or damages or sued or jail or litigation or 
dismissed or fired or allegations and #GC329# (The code for a story originating in the UK). The stories were categorised using the rubric shown in Appendix Table 2. 
Panel A shows the total number of news stories in national newspapers in the LexisNexis database. Panel B shows the number of news stories from National Newspapers 
who were in the database throughout the entire period. National Newspapers: Daily Mail, Daily Star, Mail on Sunday, Morning Star, The Express, Sunday Express, The 
Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, The Sun, The News of the World, The Guardian, The Independent, The Observer, The People, The Times, The Sunday Times. The 
Balanced Panel of Newspaper Stories: Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, The Guardian, The Independent, The Mirror, Daily Star, Observer, The Times, The Sunday Times. 
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Table 5: Total News Coverage by Story Subject 
Panel A: All Newspaper 
Stories 1992-2010 
Relevant Stories Any Relevance Stories 
News Story Subject Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types 
By School Type 
Secondary School 435 661 706 975 
(68.1%) (66.2%) (67.0%) (66.1%) 
Primary School 126 186 184 249 
(19.7%) (18.6%) (17.5%) (16.9%) 
By Teacher Gender 
Male Teacher 327 469 591 762 
(51.1%) (46.9%) (56.1%) (51.6%) 
Female Teacher 303 521 455 705 
(47.4%) (52.2%) (43.2%) (47.8%) 
All Stories 639 999 1053 1476 
Panel B: Balanced Newspaper 
Panel Stories 1992-2010 
Relevant Stories Any Relevance Stories 
News Story Subject Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types 
By School Type 
Secondary School 285 439 443 620 
(66.3%) (63.9%) (65.0%) (63.7%) 
Primary School 90 142 128 182 
(20.9%) (20.7%) (18.8%) (18.7%) 
By Teacher Gender 
Male Teacher 218 315 381 490 
(50.7%) (45.9%) (55.9%) (50.4%) 
Female Teacher 200 362 289 471 
(46.5%) (52.7%) (42.4%) (48.4%) 
All Stories 430 687 677 973 
Source: LexisNexis 1991-2010 of National Newspapers, Balanced Panel. Note: Percentages in 
parentheses represent proportion of all stories of that type on that subject. Story Type: Accusation 
includes- Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Union Activity not included under All Types 
as is only counted in national totals as not based in one region or reflect a specific teacher type. Total 
stories do not equal those from Table 3 as some stories are double counted when both male and female 
teachers are mentioned, or both primary and secondary schools are mentioned.  
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Table 6: Union Membership on News Coverage 
Panel A: Extremely  Relevant News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.548** 0.588*** 0.674** 0.502** 
0.235 0.206 0.325 0.251 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.024 -0.034** -0.047** -0.046*** 
0.018 0.015 0.019 0.014 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.509** 0.529*** 0.594*** 0.425** 
0.208 0.181 0.187 0.193 
Panel B: All Relevant News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.841*** 0.783*** 0.758*** 0.455*** 
0.158 0.139 0.200 0.148 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.041*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.026*** 
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.715*** 0.659*** 0.650*** 0.377*** 
0.133 0.115 0.121 0.133 
Panel C: Little/No Relevance News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.098 0.169 0.222 -0.151 
0.202 0.177 0.153 0.147 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
0.015 0.003 -0.004 0.005 
0.012 0.01 0.005 0.005 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.120 0.174 0.216 -0.145 
0.189 0.166 0.189 0.202 
Teacher Characteristics    
Regional Effects   
Year Effects  
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010. Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual decision to 
join a union. Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard errors are 
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation, so can be read a percentage change in probability. 
Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Stories 
Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the region that the 
teacher resides. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level.  
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Table 7: Union Membership on Regional and National News Coverage of Accusations 
Story Relevance 
P(Union Membership) 
Extremely  
Relevant 
Stories 
(1) 
Relevant 
Stories 
(2) 
Little/No 
Relevance 
(3) 
Stories Regionally 0.485* 0.442*** -0.159 
0.265 0.147 0.137 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.042*** -0.022*** 0.005 
0.015 0.007 0.004 
Stories Nationally 0.108** 0.030 -0.261 
0.051 0.044 0.236 
Stories Nationally 
Squared 
-0.002* 0.000 0.005*** 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.472* 0.408** -0.285** 
0.244 0.133 0.143 
Total Effect at Mean 0.980** 0.941** -2.022 
Teacher Characteristics    
Regional Effects    
Time Trend    
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual decision 
to join a union. Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard 
errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation, so estimates can be read a 
percentage change in probability. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, 
Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news 
stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months. 
Stories Nationally is a count for the number of all news stories in the previous 12 months, 
including stories that could not be allocated to a specific region. Standard errors in italics, 
clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 8: Union Membership on Union Membership by Teacher and Story School  Type 
Stories of Accusations All Story Types 
Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.683*** 0.045 0.431** 0.090 
0.198 0.130 0.156 0.111 
Panel B: Relevant Secondary School Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.892*** 0.051 0.388* 0.129 
0.196 0.274 0.208 0.191 
Panel C: Relevant Primary School Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.114 0.633 0.047 0.633* 
0.634 0.662 0.312 0.314 
Teacher Characteristics     
Regional Effects     
Year Effects     
Observations 13,949 14,076 13,949 14,076 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual decision to join a union 
on news stories. Reporting the marginal effects at mean after accounting for quadratic terms. All 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation, so estimates can be read 
a percentage change in probability. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and 
Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Stories 
Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides 
in the previous 12 months. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
Table 9: Union Membership on Union Membership by Teacher and Story Gender 
Stories of Accusations All Story Types 
Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Total Marginal Effect  0.031 0.508*** 0.134 0.296*** 
0.135 0.170 0.149 0.114 
Panel B: Relevant Male Teacher Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.587* 0.886*** 0.539* 0.471* 
0.339 0.293 0.330 0.241 
Panel C: Relevant Female Teacher Stories 
Total Marginal Effect -0.070 0.398 0.073 0.134 
0.288 0.372 0.192 0.195 
Teacher Characteristics     
Regional Effects     
Year Effects     
Observations 8,361 22,031 8,361 22,031 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual decision to join a union 
on news stories. Reporting the marginal effects at mean after accounting for quadratic terms. All 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation so estimates can be read a 
percentage change in probability. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and 
Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Stories 
Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides 
in the previous 12 months. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 10: Persistence of Story Types 
Number of Stories (t) (1) (2) 
Panel A: Prior Stories 
All Stories (t-1) 0.342*** 
0.055 
Panel B: Prior Stories by School Type 
Primary Teacher 
Stories 
Secondary 
Teacher Stories 
Primary Teacher Stories (t-1) 0.122*** 0.157 
0.059 0.111 
Secondary Teacher Stories (t-1) 0.044 0.263*** 
0.030 0.056 
Panel C: Prior Stories by Gender 
Male Teacher 
Stories 
Female Teachers 
Stories 
Male Teacher Stories (t-1) 0.284*** 0.101*** 
0.058 0.039 
Female Teacher Stories (t-1) 0.056 0.080 
0.097 0.064 
Teacher Characteristics   
Regional Effects   
Year Effects   
Observations 360 360 
Source: Lexus-Nexis 1992-2010 Notes: Estimates from five OLS regressions of number of new news stories 
last year on number of new news stories this year, conditional on year and regional fixed effects. Accusation 
stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both 
Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. This only uses the first incidence of a story.  
Table 11: Union Membership on Union Membership by Occupation 
Occupation Group Teachers Education 
Assistants 
Higher 
Education 
Non Teacher 
Public Sector 
Graduates 
Non Teacher 
Graduates 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally 
0.455*** 0.688 0.235 0.196 0.064 
0.148 0.577 0.422 0.261 0.147 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally Squared 
-0.026*** -0.021 -0.018 -0.001 -0.001 
0.007 0.023 0.018 0.010 0.007 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.377*** 0.622 0.185 0.133 0.051 
0.133 0.582 0.425 0.204 0.091 
Teacher Characteristics      
Regional Effects      
Year Effects      
Observations 30,392 10,022 9,007 49,671 154,932 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Reporting the marginal effects at mean from a logit estimate. All coefficients and standard errors 
are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation, so estimates can be read a percentage change in probability. Accusation stories 
are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant 
news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides in 
the previous 12 months.  SOC codes: Educational Assistants  652, 6124;  Higher Education 230, 231, 2311, 2312. Standard errors 
in italics, clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 12: Union Membership on Union Membership by News Lag Period 
News Lag period Marginal Effects Total Marginal 
Effect 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) 
Stories Last 6 Months 0.487** 0.416** 
0.214 0.189 
Stories Last 6 Months 
Squared  
-0.053*** 
0.019 
Stories 7-12 Months 
Previous 
0.508*** 0.444*** 
0.148 0.133 
Stories 7-12 Months 
Previous Squared  
-0.037*** 
0.008 
Stories 13-18 Months 
Previous 
0.948*** 0.845*** 
0.348 0.313 
Stories 13-18 Months 
Previous Squared  
-0.078*** 
0.030 
Stories 19-24 Months 
Previous 
-0.182 -0.162 
0.217 0.195 
Stories 19-24 Months 
Previous Squared  
0.010 
0.013 
Stories 25-30 Months 
Previous 
-0.319 -0.275 
0.326 0.292 
Stories 25-30 Months 
Previous Squared  
0.035 
0.032 
Stories 31-36 Months 
Previous 
-0.385 -0.341 
0.296 0.282 
Stories 25-30 Months 
Previous Squared 
0.025 
0.010 
Teacher Characteristics   
Regional Effects   
Year Effects   
Obs 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression. Reporting the marginal 
effects All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. 
Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. 
Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Standard errors, 
in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
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Appendix Figures & Tables 
Appendix Figure 1: Union Density by Age Group over time 
Source: QLFS 1992:2010 Notes: Annual union density based on mean union membership of teachers based on QLFS 
reporting year.  
Appendix Table 1: Reasons for Union Membership 
“What were the MAIN reasons why you initially joined a teacher 
union?” 
Belief in the union movement 40% 
To improve job security 44% 
To improve terms and conditions 56% 
For solidarity with other workers 24% 
Advice/opinion on educational policy 62% 
Support in the event of allegations from pupils 85% 
No particular reason 3% 
Observations 176 
Source: Online Survey of Hertfordshire Teachers 2010/11 for unrelated evaluation of UK 
Resilience Programme on teaching staff (Murphy 2011) 
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Appendix Table 2: Media Rubric 
Allegations BeingSued Suing 
Being 
Attacked 
Criminal 
Activity Sacked 
Employment 
Tribunal 
Union 
Activity Total 
Extremely 
Relevant 
Found 
innocent, 
case 
thrown out 
Teacher 
sued for 
school 
activity 
Sues  for 
damages/ 
libel 
Pupil 
attacks 
teacher in 
classroom 
Manslaughter 
of pupil 
charges  
For health and  
safety or 
allegations 
Legitimate 
Unfair 
dismissal  
Discuss 
threat of 
allegations/ 
being sued 
Stories 322 45 100 4 12 15 61 64 623 
Highly 
Relevant 
Currently 
on trial, no 
verdict 
May be 
sued, 
could be 
sued 
Lose 
case, 
indirectly 
related to 
school 
Parent-
Pupil 
attacks 
teacher 
outside of 
school 
Criminal 
accusations 
from pupil  
Inappropriate 
behaviour, not 
up to 
standards  
Other Unfair 
dismissal,  
inappropriate 
behaviour 
As above 
but brief 
mention or 
union 
demands 
Stories 179 28 52 45 53 36 43 112 548 
Little 
Relevance 
Guilty of 
lesser 
offence, on 
trial of hard 
offence 
School/ 
Council 
sued 
Threats to 
sue for 
indirect 
teaching  
Attacked 
by ex 
pupil  
School 
related crime  
Miscellaneous  
school related 
activity 
Union back 
the dismal 
Comment 
on 
education 
policy  
Stories 155 12 3 19 123 14 12 56 394 
No 
Relevance 
Admits 
guilt of 
extreme 
sexual 
abuse 
Non 
school 
related 
activity 
Non 
school 
related 
activity 
Non 
school 
related 
activity 
Child 
pornography 
/murder 
Non-school 
related 
activity 
Non-school 
related 
activity 
Anti-union 
members 
Stories 55 1 2 10 68 4 0 4 144 
Total 711 86 157 78 256 69 116 236 1709 
Source: LexisNeuxs (UK) Results of all stories from national newspapers with the word ‘teacher’ in the headline and included any of the following terms (or 
derivatives) in the headline or preliminary paragraphs of the main text (as defined by LexisNexis); teacher, damages, sued, litigation, allegation, jail, court, 
dismissed or fired, over the period September 1991 to August 2010.
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Appendix Table 3: Table 6 with Score-Bootstrap P-values in parentheses and robust clustered 
standard error in italics  
Panel A: Extremely Relevant News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.548** 0.588*** 0.674** 0.502** 
0.235 0.206 0.325 0.251 
[0.019] [0.004] [0.002] [0.023] 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.024 -0.034** -0.047** -0.046*** 
0.018 0.015 0.019 0.014 
[0.213] [0.026] [0.007] [0.009] 
Marginal Effect at Mean 0.509** 0.529*** 0.594*** 0.425** 
0.208 0.181 0.187 0.193 
[0.011] [0.005] [0.001] [0.027] 
Panel B: All Relevant News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.841*** 0.783*** 0.758*** 0.455*** 
0.158 0.139 0.200 0.148 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.041*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.026*** 
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
Marginal Effect at Mean 0.715*** 0.659*** 0.650*** 0.377*** 
0.133 0.115 0.121 0.133 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
Panel C: Little/No Relevance News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.098 0.169 0.222 -0.151 
0.202 0.177 0.153 0.147 
[0.640] [0.329] [0.249] [0.477] 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
0.015 0.003 -0.004 0.005 
0.012 0.01 0.005 0.005 
[0.204] [0.764] [0.666] [0.667] 
Marginal Effect at Mean 0.120 0.174 0.216 -0.145 
0.189 0.166 0.189 0.202 
[0.483] [0.271] [0.273] [0.489] 
Teacher Characteristics    
Regional Effects   
Year Effects  
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010. Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual 
decision to join a union. Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard 
errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation, so can be read a percentage change in 
probability. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal 
Activity. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the 
region that the teacher resides. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
Score-bootstrap p-values in brackets.  
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Appendix Table 4: Union Membership Alternate Functional Forms for Media Coverage 
Panel A: Linear  
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.148 0.121 0.156* -0.016 
0.113 0.096 0.070 0.059 
Panel B: Linear Capped at 95th Percentile 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.545** 0.518*** 0.591*** 0262*** 
0.240 0.178 0147 0.113 
Panel C: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.508* 0533*** 0694*** 0.271* 
0.262 0.202 0.160 0.142 
Panel D: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Capped at 95th Percentile 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0632** 0.690*** 0.895*** 0.439*** 
0.316 0.235 0.207 0.152 
Panel E: Little/No Relevance News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.841*** 0.783*** 0.758*** 0.455*** 
0.158 0.139 0.200 0.148 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.041*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.026*** 
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.715*** 0.659*** 0.650*** 0.377*** 
0.133 0.115 0.121 0.133 
Teacher Characteristics    
Regional Effects   
Year Effects  
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Reporting the marginal effects at mean, all coefficients and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a 
percentage change in probability. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being 
Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news 
stories. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. This table presents five 
different functional forms for media coverage; linear, linear capped at 95% percentile; inverse 
hyperbolic sign (which approximates to logarithmic which can include zero), capped inverse 
hyperbolic sign, and quadratic. 
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Appendix Table 5: Union Membership by News Coverage Type 
News Type 
Removed 
None - Union 
Activity 
-Attacked -Sacked -Tribunal -Suing - Criminal -Sued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Marginal 
Effect at Mean 
0.255*** 0.259*** 0.249** 0.240** 0.260*** 0.377*** 0.394*** 0.511*** 
0.099 0.100 0.102 0.103 0.100 0.133 0.141 0.157 
News Types 
Separately 
Allegations Union 
Activity 
Attacked Sacked Tribunal Suing Criminal Sued 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14 (15) (16) 
Marginal 
Effect at Mean 
0.511*** 0.703 1.261** 0.719 0.238 0.194 0.617 0.288 
0.157 1.102 0.502 0.711 0.546 0.364 0.765 0.542 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Reporting the marginal effects at mean calculated. Estimates 1-8 sequentially remove a story types, starting with all types (1) and ending with only allegations. 
Estimates 9-16 estimate the impact for each type of news story separately. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number 
of news stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous year. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
Appendix Table 6: Union Membership Excluding Regions Sequentially 
Excluded Region None All London 
Inner 
London 
Outer 
London South East
South 
West 
Tyne & 
Wear 
Rest of 
N.East 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Marginal Effect 0.377*** 0.357** 0.351*** 0.394*** 0.499*** 0.357*** 0.372*** 0.380*** 
0.133 0.147 0.134 0.145 0.148 0.132 0.133 0.133 
Observations 30,392 27,409 29,487 28,314 25,998 27,996 29,932 29,644 
Excluded Region G.Manch-
ester 
Mersy-
side 
Rest of 
N.West 
S.Yorks-
hire 
West 
Yorkshire 
Rest of 
Yorkshire 
East 
Midlands 
Met-W. 
Midlands 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Marginal Effect 0.411*** 0.390*** 0.446*** 0.381*** 0.443*** 0.375*** 0.383*** 0.356*** 
0.139 0.135 0.137 0.134 0.137 0.133 0.133 0.135 
Observations 29,258    29,737    28,891    29,767    29,237    29,539    28,173    29,147    
Excluded Region West 
Midlands 
East 
England Wales 
Strath-
clyde 
Rest of 
Scotland 
Northern 
Ireland 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
Marginal Effect 0.380*** 0.370*** 0.295** 0.365*** 0.393*** 0.369*** 
0.136 0.137 0.145 0.138 0.142 0.136 
Observations 28,948    27,440    28,880    29,211    28,658    29,191   
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage 
change in probability. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Standard 
errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
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Appendix Table 7: Union Membership by News Coverage Period 
News Coverage period In last 6 
months 
In last 12 
months 
In last 18 
Months 
In last 24 
Months 
In last 30 
Months 
In last 36 
Months 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally 
0.540** 0.449*** 0.521*** 0.331*** 0.141 0.065 
0.260 0.149 0.107 0.119 0.103 0.104 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally Squared 
-0.058*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.014** -0.005 -0.001 
0.019 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.472* 0.380** 0.429*** 0.258** 0.112 0.055 
0.261 0.150 0.425 0.204 0.106 0.109 
Teacher Characteristics       
Regional Effects       
Year Effects       
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard errors are 
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation so estimates can be read a percentage change in probability. Accusation 
stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely 
and Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the 
region that the teacher resides in the previous X months. Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
Appendix Table 8: Union Membership on News Coverage of Accusations and Actual 
Allegations 
News Relevance Extremely Relevant Stories Relevant Stories 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stories Regionally 0.348** 0.335*** 0.220 0.197 
0.140 0.109 0.173 0.168 
Stories Regionally Squared -0.055** -0.040** -0.050 -0.046 
0.021 0.019 0.093 0.065 
Allegations Per 100 Teachers -0.310* -0.355 -0.310* -0.388 
0.227 0.215 0.227 0.253 
Teacher Characteristics       
Regional Effects       
Year Effects       
Observations 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 
Source: QLFS 2008-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression. Reporting the marginal effects All coefficients and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being 
Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Standard errors, in 
italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
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Appendix for Online Publication 
Online Appendix 1: Local Authorities who responded to the Freedom of information 
request regarding allegations 
All Local Authorities who responded (Years of data): 
Local Authority (Years), Barnet (2) Barnsley (3), Bath and North East Somerset (3),  Bedford (1),  Bexley (2), 
Blackburn with Darwen (3),  Bolton (3),  Bracknell Forest (2),  Bradford (3),  Brent (4),  Bristol City (3),  Bromley 
(3),  Buckinghamshire (4),  Calderdale (3),  Cambridge (2),  Camden (3),  Central Bedfordshire (1),  Cheshire East 
Council (1),  Cheshire West and Chester (2),  Cornwall (1),  Croyden (3),  Cumbria (3),  Derby (1),  Derbyshire 
(3),  Devon (1),  Doncaster (3),  Dorset (3),  Dudley (3),  Durham (3),  East Riding of Yorkshire (4),  East Sussex 
(2),  Essex (4),  Gateshead (3),  Gloustershire (2),  Greenwich (4),  Hackney (1),  Hammersmith and Fulham (2), 
Hampshire (3),  Haringey (2),  Havering (4),  Hertfordshire (2),  Hillingdon (3),  Hounslow (2),  Isle of Scilly (4), 
Isle of Wight (3),  Islington (4),  Kensington and Chelsea (2),  Kent (4),  Kingston Upon Hull (3),  Kingston Upon 
Thames (4),  Kirklees (3),  Knowsley (3),  Lancashire (4),  Leeds (4),  Leicester (3),  Lewisham (4),  Lincolnshire 
(1),  Liverpool (1),  Luton (2),  Manchester (2),  Medway (3),  Milton Keyenes (1),  Newham (1),  Norfolk (3), 
North East Lincolnshire (3),  North Lincolnshire (1),  North Somerset (4),  North Yorkshire (3),  Northumberland 
(4),  Nottingham City (4),  Nottingham County (2),  Oldham (4),  Oxfordshire (4),  Peterborough (1),  Plymouth 
(4),  Poole (3),  Reading (4),  Redbridge (3),  Richmond (1),  Rochdale (3),  Rotherham (1),  Rutland (4),  Salford 
(4),  Sandwell (3),  Scilly Isles (4),  Sheffield (2),  Shropshire (1),  Slough (2),  Solihull (4),  Somerset (4),  South 
Glouster (2),  Southampton (2),  Southend (3),  St Helens (4),  Stockport (4),  Suffolk (3),  Surrey (2),  Sutton (2), 
Swindon (2),  Telford and Wrekin (2),  Thurrock (4),  Torbay (3),  Trafford (2),  Wakefield (3),  Walsall (4), 
Waltham Forest (3),  Wandsworth (4),  Warrington (2),  West Berkshire (2),  West Sussex (3),  Wigan (2), 
Wiltshire (2),  Winsor and Maidenhead (2),  Wirral (4),  Wokingham (2),  Wolverhampton (2),  Worcestershire 
(4),  York (3),  All (323) 
Balanced Panel of Local Authorities 2008-2010: 
Barnsley, Bath and North East Somerset, Blackburn with Darwen, Bolton, Bradford, Brent, Bristol City, Bromley, 
Buckinghamshire, Calderdale, Camden, Croydon, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Doncaster, Dorset, Dudley, Durham, East 
Riding of Yorkshire, Essex, Greenwich, Hampshire, Havering, Hillingdon, Isle of Scilly, Isle of Wight, Islington, 
Kent, Kingston Upon Hull, Kingston Upon Thames, Kirklees, Lancashire, Leeds, Leicester, Lewisham, Medway, 
North East Lincolnshire, North Somerset, North Yorkshire, Northumberland, Nottingham City, Oldham, 
Oxfordshire, Plymouth, Poole, Reading, Redbridge, Rutland, Salford, Sandwell, Sicily Isles, Solihull, Somerset, 
Southend, St Helens, Stockport, Suffolk, Thurrock, Torbay, Wakefield, Walsall, Waltham forest, Wandsworth, 
West Sussex, Wirral, Worcestershire 
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Online Appendix Table 1: Union Membership by Teacher and Story School Type – Showing 
Quadratic Terms 
Accusation Stories All Story Types 
Probability of Union 
Membership 
Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Stories Regionally 0.803*** 0.069 0.529*** 0.128 
0.238 0.146 0.192 0.133 
Stories Regionally Squared -0.036** -0.009 -0.020*** -0.009 
0.010 0.007 0.007 0.006 
Panel B: Relevant Secondary School Stories 
Secondary Stories 1.002*** 0.066 0.453* 0.154 
0.223 0.302 0.240 0.217 
Secondary Stories Squared -0.050** -0.008 -0.021** -0.009 
0.010 0.015 0.010 0.010 
Panel C: Relevant Primary School Stories 
Primary Stories 0.092 0.699 -0.021 0.713* 
0.6563 0.670 0.450 0.352 
Primary Stories Squared 0.037 -0.109* 0.069 -0.079* 
0.069 0.069 0.063 0.035 
Observations 13,949 14,076 13,949 14,076 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual decision to join 
a union on news stories. Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard 
errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage change 
in probability. All estimates conditional on teacher characteristics Accusation stories are stories 
involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both 
Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of 
news stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months. 
Standard errors, in italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
Online Appendix Table 2: Union Membership by Teacher and Story School Type – Showing 
Quadratic Terms 
Accusation Stories All Story Types 
Probability of Union 
Membership 
Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Stories 0.067 0.606*** 0.205 0.370*** 
0.151 0.199 0.174 0.135 
Stories Squared -0.014** -0.031** -0.017** -0.016** 
0.006 0.009 0.006 0.005 
Panel B: Relevant Male Teacher Stories 
Male Stories 0.721* 1.100*** 0.666** 0.606* 
0.398 0.370 0.416 0.353 
Male Stories Squared -0.105** -0.151*** -0.068 -0.068 
0.047 0.055 0.051 0.057 
Panel C: Relevant Female Teacher Stories 
Female Stories -0.053 0.445 0.1117 0.159 
0.309 0.412 0.212 0.220 
Female Stories Squared -0.014 -0.029 -0.019* -0.010 
0.016 0.022 0.008 0.009 
Observations 8,361 22,031 8,361 22,031 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression of individual decision to join a 
union on news stories. Reporting the marginal effects at mean. All coefficients and standard errors 
are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage change in 
probability. All estimates conditional on teacher characteristics Accusation stories are stories 
involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely 
and Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that 
originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months. Standard errors, in 
italics, are clustered at the regional level. 
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